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I. INTRODUCTION
In commercial litigation, plaintiffs commonly seek lost profits damages.
Many courts have allowed a degree of uncertainty in the calculation of damages and
have articulated a standard that damages need to be calculated with only “reasonable
certainty.”1 Intersecting with this standard is a commonly held perception that
simple methods of calculating damages are often more understandable and
persuasive to a judge or jury than more complex methods. When presented with the
results of such simple methods, should the trier of fact be “reasonably certain” that
the results are accurate? Moreover, should there be a concern that the lost profits
damages presented have been manipulated to provide a favorable result? This article
brings empirical evidence to bear on these highly important issues. The accuracy and
manipulability of damages calculations influences whether the law will result in the
attainment of such goals as just compensation, optimal deterrence of harmful acts,
and efficient breach of contract.
This article will evaluate several versions of the well established and often
used “before and after” approach to damages calculations by applying this method to
a large sample of undamaged United States firms. This sample simply assumes a
fictional damaging event and damage date for these firms. Thus, unlike an actual
litigation environment in which the damages are unknown and typically in dispute,
the damages for this sample are known with certainty to be equal to zero. The
certainty of the actual damages for the sample allows a comparison of the damages
Jonathan Tomlin: Principal, LECG, LLC, Los Angeles, California 90067. David Merrell: Analysis
Group Inc., Dallas, Texas. The opinions in this article do not necessarily represent those of LECG or
Analysis Group.

*

1 See, e.g., ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 668 (3d Cir. 1998); City
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generated by a particular calculation method and, thus, for an assessment of the
accuracy of the calculated damages. Any calculated damages are “phantom”
damages that result from an inaccurate calculation.
Damages methods that courts have previously used and accepted are highly
capable of producing substantial “phantom” damages and are highly capable of
manipulation. For example, out of the three methods employed in the sample, there
exists at least one method that yields non-existent “lost” revenues that exceed 20%
of actual revenues for about half of the sample firms. These results indicate that
many damages methods should require additional evidence on their appropriateness,
and courts should inquire as to why the litigants chose particular methods. Without
such additional information, the trier of fact should have little certainty that the
damages presented are accurate and have not been manipulated.
Section I below provides an overview of the law and economics of lost
profits calculations. Section II explains the theoretical sources of uncertainty that
arise from the use of simple damages methodologies. This uncertainty can arise
from the failure of a particular method to yield accurate damages calculations or
from manipulation in applying the method or choosing data. Section III explains the
data sample and the results obtained. As shown, the various methods often yield
substantial damages when they do not, in fact, exist. Section IV assesses the
prospects of courts excluding simple damages calculations when they are unreliable
and explains factors to which courts should look in evaluating damages methods.
Section V concludes the article.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CALCULATION OF LOST PROFITS:
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. Economics of Lost Profits Calculations
A plaintiff may incur lost profits due to a variety of harmful acts such as
fraud, false advertising, antitrust violations, intellectual property infringement, and
breach of contract. Lost profits are equal to the difference between the profits that
the plaintiff would have received “but-for” the harmful act and the actual profits
received by the plaintiff, appropriately adjusted to present value.2 For example, if a

2 See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 789-91 (4th ed.
1997); GLICK ET AL., supra note 1, at 35; Robert E. Hall & Victoria A. Lazear, Reference Guide on
Estimation of Economic Losses in Damages Awards, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
277, 281 (2d ed, 2000); Victoria A. Lazear, Estimating Lost Profits and Economic Losses, in LITIGATION
SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 5.4 (3d ed. 2001); Jonathan T. Tomlin,
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plaintiff would have earned $100 in profits had a harmful act not occurred (the “butfor” scenario), but it actually earned only $75 (the "real world"), then lost profits are
equal to $25 ($100 minus $75 is equal to the profits the plaintiff lost as a result of the
harmful act). Approaches to calculating damages include the “before and after”
approach, the “yardstick” or “control group” approach, and other approaches based
on the economics of the hypothetical “but-for” scenario.3
The “before and after” approach entails a comparison of the plaintiff's
financial performance during the time period in which it was presumably impacted
by the harmful act or acts of the defendant with another time period in which the
plaintiff was presumably not impacted. The hypothetical “but-for” scenario is one in
which the plaintiff would have performed in accordance with the benchmark time
period chosen.
The “yardstick” or “control group” approach entails comparing the plaintiff’s
performance to a financial benchmark based on an alternative geographic area,
product line, distribution channel, industry, or firm. For example, the “yardstick”
approach may create a hypothetical “but-for” scenario in which one assumes that the
plaintiff would have obtained profits consistent with other firms in the same
industry.
In applying the “yardstick” approach or the “before and after” approach,
additional factors that may have impacted the plaintiff's performance may also be
taken into account. In addition to the “before and after” approach and the
“yardstick” approach, other methods are available that may include calculating costs
incurred by a plaintiff as a result of the harmful behavior at issue.
Methods for calculating damages range from simple to sophisticated. Simple
methods used in litigation include comparing the average revenues or profits of a
plaintiff before the harmful act at issue with its revenues or profits following the
harmful act. More sophisticated methods include the use of multiple regression
techniques to analyze lost profits by controlling for other factors outside of the

Distinguishing the Legal from the Illegal in Antitrust Damages Calculations: Lessons from Netscape v. Microsoft,
17 J. FOREN. ECON. 223, 233-34 (2004).
See generally Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 793 (6th Cir. 2002); ROBERT L.
DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS § 1.1 (5th ed. 1998 & supp. 2005); PATRICK A.
GAUGHAN, MEASURING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES AND OTHER COMMERCIAL DAMAGES 4550 (2004); Tomlin, supra note 2, at 233-35.
3
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defendant’s harmful behavior that may have impacted the plaintiff’s profits.4 The
use of multiple regression techniques has become quite common in litigation.5
As many commentators on the presentation of damages calculations have
observed, simple methods of calculating damages may often appeal to a party
attempting to persuade the trier of fact. As Rubinfeld and Steiner note, “a simple
graph with a firmly asserted conclusion, even if spurious, can be quickly grasped and
readily accepted.”6 Gaughan writes, “Because the methods used must be explained
to a judge or jury, who most likely do not have a background in statistical analysis,
simple methods have certain advantages. Only if it can be demonstrated that the
sophisticated methods are significantly more accurate should they be contemplated.”7
Davis and Laguzza write, “[J]urors, like most other humans, are cognitive misers
who prefer to avoid complexity, so they tend to accept arguments that relieve them
of the duty to investigate and understand unfamiliar information.”8
Because of a perceived lack of sophistication on the part of judges and juries
and the corresponding perception that simple damages models will be persuasive,
experts often present simple models that do not account for other factors potentially
impacting the plaintiff firm. Thus, a highly important question arises as to the
reliability of such simple models.
B. The Law
Courts generally allow a plaintiff a degree of uncertainty in calculating
damages, thus making the burden of quantifying damages lower than than that of
See, e.g., Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179, 182-83 (2d ed. 2000) (hereinafter “Rubinfeld, Multiple Regression”); Michael
O. Finkelstein & Hans Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-Fixing Cases, 46 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 145 (1983); Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 702, 702 (1980); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1048, 1048 (1985) (hereinafter “Rubinfeld, Econometrics”).
4

5

Rubinfeld, Multiple Regression, supra note 4, at 182; Fisher, supra note 4, at 702.

Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter O. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69, 140 (1983).
6

7

GAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 144.

8

David Scott Davis & Ross Laguzza, Communicating with a Jury, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK:
15.7 (3d ed. 2001).
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proving the fact of damages. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f the damage is
certain, the fact that its extent is uncertain does not prevent a recovery.”9 Courts
often apply a threshold of “reasonable certainty.”10 As the Third Circuit has
explained, “reasonable certainty embraces a rough calculation that is not ‘too
speculative, vague or contingent’ upon some unknown factor.”11
Courts may exclude the damages testimony of lay persons or expert
witnesses if the testimony does not meet the standards of proper case law (such as
“reasonable certainty”). If an expert witness presents the damages testimony in a
federal case, the testimony must meet the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.12 The Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.13 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael14 prompted a revision of Rule
702 in order to clarify the standards developed in these decisions.15 Daubert listed a
non-exclusive four-part test for federal judges to use in evaluating the admissibility of
expert testimony.16 In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court explained that Daubert applied
not only to scientific testimony but also to testimony based on “technical” and
“other specialized” knowledge.17 Many states have adopted standards similar to the

9

Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 566 (1931).

10

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

11 ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Spang & Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 545 A.2d 861, 866 (Pa. 1988)).

See Charles W. Gerdts III & Carol E. Dixon, The Federal Law Governing Expert Witness Testimony, in
LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 2.1 (3d ed. 2001); GLICK
ET AL., supra note 1, at 27; Robert G. Badal & Edward J. Slizewski, Economic Testimony Under Fire, 87
A.B.A.J. 56, 56 (Nov. 2001); Christopher B. Hockett et al., Revisiting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony
in Antitrust Cases, 15 ANTITRUST 7, 7-11 (Summer 2001).
12

13

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

14

526 U.S. 137 (1999).

15

GLICK ET AL., supra note 1, at 27.

16

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.

17

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141.
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federal standards for assessing expert evidence, although the approach varies
between states.18
This paper focuses on assessing the reliability and manipulability of simple
implementations of the “before and after” method of calculating damages. Federal
and state courts across the country have utilized and accepted various
implementations of the “before and after” approach.19 Often, the period before the
defendant’s allegedly harmful act is used as a benchmark against which to measure
the plaintiff’s damages incurred during a period in which the harmful act was
expected to impact the plaintiff.20 Other times, however, courts use the plaintiff’s
subsequent experience as the benchmark.21 Courts have evaluated the reliability of
utilizing a “before” period of as little as one week as a benchmark for damages.22 In
many cases, courts have found time periods of a few years or less to be a reliable
basis for calculating the plaintiff’s damages. 23
Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court addressed the reliability of a
simple application of the “before and after” approach in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Materials Co.24 In that antitrust case, the plaintiff alleged that, as a result
of the defendant’s anticompetitive acts, it was unable to obtain goods important to
See Joseph A. Keierleber & Thomas L. Bohan, Ten Years After Daubert: the Status of the States, 50 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1, 3 (2005).

18

See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927); DUNN, supra note
3, at § 5.1.
19

20

DUNN, supra note 3, at §§ 5.1, 5.5.

See, e.g., Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp., 902 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1990); see also DUNN,
supra note 3, at § 5.6.
21

22 See UST Corp. v. Gen. Rd. Trucking Corp., 783 A.2d 931, 943 (R.I. 2001) (“only one week of data
for profit projections simply does not rise to the requisite level of reasonable certainty necessary to
recover future lost profits”).
23 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 376, 379 (four year “before” period); Tingley Sys., Inc. v. Norse
Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 93, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1995) (one and a half year “before” period); Swierczynski v.
Arnold Foods Co., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (four year “before” period used
to calculate damages for 20 year damages period); Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales &
Mktg., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 393-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (3 month “before” period used to
calculate damages for 3 year damages period).
24

273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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its business from the defendant for a four year period.25 The plaintiff calculated its
damages as the gross profits on its sale of the defendant's goods for the four years
preceding the suit (after subtracting additional expenses that would have been
incurred in selling these goods).26 Thus, the damages methodology simply assumed
that during the period of presumed harm gross profits would have been equal to
those in prior years and made no other adjustments. In addressing the defendant's
claim that “the plaintiff's damages were purely speculative,” the Court opined that
“plaintiff's evidence as to the amount of damages, while mainly circumstantial, was
competent; and that it sufficiently showed the extent of the damages, as a matter of
just and reasonable inference, to warrant the submission of this question to the
jury.”27
Since Eastman Kodak, simple implementations of the “before and after”
method have been employed numerous times and have continued to be employed
after Daubert.28 In Tingley Systems, Inc. v. Norse Systems, Inc.,29 for example, Norse
alleged, inter alia, tortious interference with its business relations.30 Norse calculated
its lost profits for a three year period as the difference between its profits during that
period and average profits (projected over three years) for an eighteen month period
preceding the alleged interference.31 Thus, the “before” benchmark was simply the
average profits for the previous eighteen months, and the method assumed that the
proper “but-for” scenario was one in which Norse would have earned the same
profits during the damages period as it did during the eighteen month period had the
allegedly harmful conduct by Tingley not occurred. In reviewing Tingley's claim that
the method failed to prove a connection between its actions and lost profits, the

25

Id. at 368-69.

26

Id. at 376.

27

Id. at 378-79.

See, e.g., Tingley Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d at 97-98; Swierczynski, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 811; Shade Foods, Inc., 93
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393.

28

29

49 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1995).

30

Id. at 95.

31

Id. at 97-98.
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Second Circuit concluded that “[t]he jury could reasonably have accepted Norse's
calculations of the profits lost due to Tingley's interference….”32
C. Overview of Our Approach
When presented with a calculation of lost profits damages, when should the
trier of fact be “reasonably certain” of its accuracy?33 For example, if the sales for a
particular business decline 20% during the period of harmful behavior, is this an
unusual occurrence and therefore solid evidence of the harmful behavior’s effect on
profits? Or are such fluctuations in sales quite typical and, therefore, of little or no
useful guidance on the issue? In addition, not only might the choice of calculation
method lead to uncertain results, but the data or the model may have been “cherry
picked” and therefore subject to manipulation by the presenter.
This article focuses on the “before and after” model in addressing these
questions for four reasons. First, simple methods are often employed in litigation,
and the conventional wisdom is that simple models may be more persuasive to the
trier of fact. Second, courts have accepted the “before and after” method on
numerous occasions. Third, the “before and after” approach allows application of
the same method to a large sample of firms, unlike other methods, such as the
yardstick approach, which typically involve the use of data that is specific to a
particular case. Finally, the results from application of simple damages methods are
more widely applicable to other methods.
III. SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY IN LOST PROFITS CALCULATIONS
Inaccuracies in proffered lost profits calculations can result from inaccuracies
inherent in the method and data employed. They can also result from manipulation
of the method, inappropriate use of the method, or both.

32

Id. at 98.

33 Some commentators have discussed whether a standard of “reasonable certainty” is a desirable
standard. See, e.g., Doug Carleton, Note: Averting the New Business' Battle to Prove Lost Profits: A
Reintroduction of the Traditional Reasonable Certainty Rule as Penalty Default, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 157576 (1994). This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, as it focuses not on whether the standard is
appropriate but on the ability of damages models to meet this standard.
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A. Inaccuracies Inherent in the Method
Proper calculation of lost profits entails determining the profits that the
plaintiff would have earned in a hypothetical scenario in which the defendant’s
harmful act or acts did not occur. At the most basic level, the profits of a firm are
determined by the demand factors and the supply conditions for that firm. In the
economic model of perfect competition, a firm can sell an unlimited amount of
products and services at the perfectly competitive market price.34 The firm cannot
sell any goods or services above this price, and it has no hopes of changing this
price.35 However, few industries in the real world correspond to the perfectly
competitive model.36 Thus, the relevant demand for a firm is usually the demand
that is specific to that firm (the “firm specific” demand) and not simply a market
demand curve in which a firm can sell unlimited goods or services at the market
price. Supply factors refer to the cost conditions faced by the firm.
Accuracy in calculating profits in the “but-for” scenario results from
accurately projecting the firm specific demand and cost conditions that the plaintiff
would have faced had the harmful act or acts at issue not occurred. On the demand
side, a harmful act may eliminate demand entirely (e.g., when the harmful act puts
the plaintiff out of business), or it may shift demand. Demand may shift for a variety
of reasons, including changed perceptions on the part of consumers (e.g., false
advertising), changes in the products offered by competitors (e.g., intellectual
property infringement), or the loss of a particular customer (e.g., breach of contract
or tortious interference). On the supply side, costs may change due to changes in
input costs (e.g., antitrust allegations of price fixing or price discrimination) or
changes in the way inputs are processed (e.g., breach of contract causing the loss of a
key employee).
Thus, a harmful act may impact firm specific demand and cost conditions in
multiple ways, including shifting the demand curve or changing the responsiveness
of demand to price changes (the “elasticity” of demand).37 Damages methods
34 See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
43, 47 (1993).
35

Id.

36

See id. at 48.

See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES
193-97 (1992).
37

AND

EXTENSIONS
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accurately measure damages only if they accurately account for these changes.
Whether a simple damages method can adequately perform this task depends on the
circumstances.
B. Manipulation of the Method or the Data
In addition to questions of reliability resulting from potential inadequacies of
the damages method itself, the possibility of manipulation of the data or method
used also exists.38 When the presenter of damages is an employee of the plaintiff
company, the incentives to present a biased estimate are clear. Obviously, a large
damage award increases the profits of the firm. Such incentives may exist for
financial experts testifying on damages as well. Financial experts may perceive that
they will obtain increased business from the party that retains them if they provide
results that are favorable to their clients.39 In addition, a bias in the analysis can
result from the “slippery slope,” as the attorney retaining the expert may persuade
the expert to testify in a certain way.40 An appealing witness, in turn, may also be
able to prevail with “shoddy data or shoddy methods.”41
The possible sources for inaccurate and misleading calculations of damages
include the choice of the data set to use, the choice of variables to include in the
damages model (i.e., the factors for which to adjust in assessing the “but-for”
scenario), and the choice of “functional form” of the model (i.e., how the model is
set up).42 Because this article addresses simple damages methods, its focus is on the
potential for manipulation through data choice and model choice.

38 Of course, inaccuracies can also result from errors in implementation (such as a mathematical
error), but such errors will often be discovered in the litigation environment. Thus, we focus on
manipulation of the data and the methods used.

See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 91,
93 (1999); Robert Thornton & John Ward, The Economist in Tort Litigation, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 104
(1999).
39

40 See Michael J. Mandel, Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 119
(1999).
41

Rubinfeld & Steiner, supra note 6, at 140.

42

See Rubinfeld, Multiple Regression, supra note 4, at 185.
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The choice of data used to forecast revenues or profits in the “but-for”
scenario is capable of heavily influencing the results. For example, a firm that
experiences high variability in its sales and profits may show very different results if
its profits in the "before" period are averaged over a three year period instead of a
four year period. A three year period may show substantial profits while the
inclusion of a fourth very unprofitable year may reduce profits, and therefore
calculated damages, to zero.
In Eastman Kodak, the plaintiff used profits over a four year “before” period
as the benchmark comparison for the damages period.43 As the defendant pointed
out, however, using only the two most recent years for comparison yielded a loss for
the plaintiff (and presumably no damages).44 In Tingley, the plaintiff used average
revenues over an eighteen month “before” period as a benchmark for calculating
damages.45 However, when calculating costs, the plaintiff used only a six month
“before” period and explained that its revenues needed to be calculated over a longer
period as they “came in chunks.”46 It is natural to wonder whether calculated
average revenues would have been substantially lower if only a six month period
were used.
Another potential source of manipulation in lost profits calculations is the
choice of the method itself. For example, a firm may not have obtained any profits
averaged over a well defined “before” period. However, if one were to look at the
growth rate of the firm's revenues and assume that costs would not increase
substantially, one may well develop a method that yields damages. Various
econometric models might also yield different damages calculations and therefore
more opportunities to “find” a method that generates damages.
Ex-post model selection in an attempt to find favorable results obviously
biases damages calculations in favor of the party presenting them. The process also
renders invalid standard statistical tests used to assess the reliability of statistical
models.47 The realm of academic research has long recognized that researchers have
43

Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).

44

Id. at 378.

45

Tingley Sys., Inc. v. Norse Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 93, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1995).

46

Id. at 98.

See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 85, 88 (2d ed. 2000).
47
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an incentive to find results that are more likely to generate publishable research and
that they may engage in “ex-post model selection” to generate such results.48
Because of this, academics often report the results from various specifications of the
models they considered. The concern that a researcher has generated biased results
through ex-post model selection in academia should exist in the litigation context as
well.49
IV. ASSESSING THE ACCURACY AND MANIPULABILITY OF METHODS
FOR CALCULATING LOST PROFITS
The damages sustained by a plaintiff are typically a matter of dispute in
litigation. Thus, finding a sample of firms that can be used to compare the actual
damages sustained with the damages calculated by a particular method (and therefore
assessing the accuracy of the damages measured by that method) would seem to be a
difficult task. However, there is at least one group of firms in which the amount of
damages may be calculated with certainty: for those firms suffering no damages,
damages are known to be equal to zero. After obtaining such a sample of firms, we
assume a fictional harmful event and date on which this fictional event occurred.
Any damages calculated for the sample are “phantom” damages and are a result of
inaccuracies resulting from the method, inappropriate data choice, or both.50 This
sample allows an assessment of both the accuracy and the manipulability of lost
profits methods. This assessment focuses on several implementations of the “before
and after” approach.
A. The Data Used
We obtained annual (fiscal year) revenue data for the period 1995-2004 for all
United States firms contained in Standard and Poor's Compustat North America
database. Compustat compiles detailed financial information for publicly traded
48 See Edward E. Leamer, False Models and Post-Data Model Construction, 69 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 122, 126
(1974); Edward Leamer & Herman Leonard, Reporting the Fragility of Regression Estimates, 65 REV. ECON
& STAT. 306, 306 (1983).

See Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 110203 (1985).

49

50 Economic damages are equal to lost revenues minus the incremental costs that would have been
incurred to produce the goods or services necessary to generate the lost revenues. As long as profit
margins are positive, lost revenues lead to lost profits damages. We focus solely on lost revenues and
do not take the subsequent step of subtracting out incremental costs as the calculation of incremental
costs is likely to be firm specific and it is unnecessary to address the issues of concern in this article.
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companies. We attempted to screen out firms that experienced highly unusual
changes in revenues. Accordingly, we deleted all firms which experienced an
increase of over ten times prior year revenues in any single year.51 We applied several
different damages methodologies to the sample firms. To be included in the analysis
of a particular method, a firm must have had complete annual revenue data
throughout the period under consideration. The final number of firms in our sample
ranged from 3,739 to 5,544, depending on the date range and method considered.
Because the sample only includes firms with data throughout the periods
under consideration, firms that performed so poorly that they ceased business
operations are necessarily excluded. Thus, there may be a “survivorship bias” that
influences the data set in the direction of including more successful firms. Any such
survivorship bias, however, should tend to make the finding of non-existent damages
less likely (and therefore makes a finding of such damages even stronger evidence of
an innacuracy).
B. Results from Using Simple Averages to Forecast “Lost” Sales
In order to apply the damages methodologies we examine, we will create a
fictional lawsuit for each firm in our sample that specifies a non-existent harmful
event to that firm allegedly occurring in the year 2000. Our fictional lawsuit seeks
lost profits damages for the year 2000 for this non-existent harmful act. In actuality,
we have not examined actual events occurring in the year 2000 for any of the firms
in our sample and have no a priori reason to believe that there was any particular
damaging event occurring in 2000 for any firm in the sample. The year 2000 is
chosen because it allows us to average several years of data both before and after the
hypothetical damage year. It is also chosen so as to avoid the year 2001, which was a
recessionary year according to the dating conventions used by the National Bureau
of Economic Research. Because our harmful event is non-existent, any calculated
damages are non-existent as well and represent an inaccurate calculation of damages.
True damages are equal to zero.52

51 We also deleted the firm “Pittsburgh and West Virginia Railroad” as it showed extremely small
revenues and no change in revenues for numerous quarters.

It is certainly possible that some of the firms in our sample experienced an event in 2000 that
caused their profits to decline in this year (and perhaps to decline substantially). However, these lost
profits would not be attributable to the fictional harmful event that we assume. Any calculated
damages resulting from this event would still be inaccurate as they would be attributed to our fictional
event (and not to the actual event causing the lost profits).

52
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An obvious way to forecast the sales that a defendant firm would have
received in a “but-for” scenario in which the alleged harmful act did not occur is
simply to suppose that the plaintiff would have received the same revenues during
the period of harm as it did on average over some benchmark period. Under this
approach, lost revenues equal the difference between the average revenues over the
benchmark period and the actual revenues during the period of perceived harm. As
noted above, this simple approach has been used in litigation and accepted by the
courts on several occasions.53 It has also been advanced as a potentially acceptable
approach by at least one practitioner text on the calculation of lost profits.54
“Lost” revenues for the year 2000 are calculated as a percentage of actual
revenues that year. One may question whether any particular level of phantom
“lost” revenues constitutes a substantial inaccuracy as opposed to an inconsequential
amount that should be of little concern in litigation. This amounts to a consideration
of what can be labeled the “practical significance” of our results as opposed to any
statistical significance found. For example, in theory, a damages method could yield
a statistically significant result that damages were equal to $1. However, the $1 in
damages could hardly be considered practically significant.
Unfortunately, there is no particular threshold for “practical significance” as
opposed to statistical significance and, thus, no particular threshold to guide us in
examining “lost” revenue percentages in this instance.55 Therefore, we present the
percentage of firms for which the simple use of average revenues to forecast “butfor” revenues exceeds certain thresholds. As Table 1 below shows, for over 20% of
the firms in our sample, this method generates “lost” revenues that do not exist for
each of four different “before” periods (ranging from two years to five years).56 For
approximately 10% of the firms, these phantom “lost” revenues exceed 30% of year
2000 revenues.
53

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

54 GAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 145 (“When the plaintiff has experienced both positive and negative
growth, the expert needs to apply judgment in selecting the appropriate base. One possible
alternative is the use of average revenues computed over prior years, such as the past three years”).
55

Rubinfeld, Multiple Regression, supra note 4, at 191-92 & n.34.

Using 2001 as the hypothetical damage year led to larger phantom “lost” profits and shows the
particular pitfalls that may be present in overlooking important economic factors (in this case a
recession). The number of firms with calculated “lost” revenues exceeding each threshold level were
higher for 2001 than for 2000.
56
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Table 1:

Percentage of Firms for Which Calculated “Lost” Revenues
Exceed Given Thresholds For a Fictional Year 2000 Damage
Date Based on Average “Before” Period Revenues
Percentage of Firms Exceeding Selected Thresholds
>0%

>10%

>20%

>30%

>40%

>50%

Sample Size

Before Period:
1995 - 1999
1996 - 1999
1997 - 1999
1998 - 1999

22%
22%
23%
24%

16%
16%
16%
16%

13%
12%
12%
12%

10%
10%
10%
9%

9%
8%
8%
8%

8%
7%
7%
6%

3,739
4,077
4,344
4,719

Mean

23%

16%

12%

10%

8%

7%

4,220

Notes: Annual revenue data obtained for publicly traded firms from Compustat. “Lost” revenues are calculated as
(average revenue over the applicable before period - year 2000 revenue)/year 2000 revenue.

Table 2 below shows the results using the five year period over 2000-2004 to
calculate lost revenues. As shown, the phantom damages calculated are equally
persistent over the longer time period. Of course, because the damages period is
longer, the total calculated “lost” revenues (and therefore the total amount by which
damages were inaccurately calculated) would be commensurately larger.
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Table 2:

Percentage of Firms for Which Calculated “Lost” Revenues
Exceed Given Thresholds For a Fictional 2000-2004 Damage
Period Based on Average “Before” Period Revenues
Percentage of Firms Exceeding Selected Thresholds
>0%

>10%

>20%

>30%

>40%

>50%

Sample Size

Before Period:
1995 - 1999
1996 - 1999
1997 - 1999
1998 - 1999

23%
24%
25%
26%

18%
19%
20%
20%

14%
15%
15%
15%

12%
12%
12%
13%

10%
10%
10%
10%

9%
9%
9%
9%

3,423
3,725
3,950
4,260

Mean

25%

19%

15%

12%

10%

9%

3,840

Notes: Annual revenue data obtained for publicly traded firms from Compustat. “Lost” revenues are calculated as
(average revenue over the applicable before period multiplied by five - total revenues 2000-2004)/total revenues
2000-2004.

Another potential “benchmark” period for consideration is the use of the
period after the period in which the harmful act allegedly occurred. This approach
has been used in litigation and accepted by the courts in numerous cases.57 A
plaintiff may use such an approach where it has no prior operating history before the
harmful event at issue or when the plaintiff believes that the period after the harmful
event better reflects the market conditions in the “but-for” scenario than that in the
period preceding the event. Table 3 below shows the percentage of firms exceeding
particular “lost” revenue thresholds when the average revenues for various periods
after 2000 are used to forecast revenues during the fictional damage year of 2000.

See, e.g., Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp., 902 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1990); DUNN, supra note
3, at §5.8. But see DUNN, supra note 3, at §5.9.

57
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Table 3:

Percentage of Firms for Which Calculated “Lost” Revenues
Exceed Given Thresholds for a Fictional Damage Date Of 2000
Based on Average Revenues Subsequent to Damage Date
Percentage of Firms Exceeding Selected Thresholds
Subsequent
Period:
2001-2004
2001-2003
2001-2002

Mean

>0%

>10%

>20%

>30%

>40%

>50%

Sample Size

61%
60%
57%

50%
48%
46%

39%
38%
37%

32%
31%
30%

26%
26%
25%

22%
21%
21%

4,954
5,155
5,544

60%

49%

38%

31%

26%

22%

5,218

Notes: Annual revenue data obtained for publicly traded firms from Compustat. “Lost” revenues are calculated as
(average revenue over the applicable subsequent period - year 2000 revenue)/year 2000 revenue.

As shown in Table 3, this method yields “lost” revenues that do not exist for
more than half of the firms in our sample. This result should be expected, as the
method uses the simple average revenues following our fictional damage date, and,
on average, one would expect that firm revenues would increase for our sample. Of
more interest is the frequency with which this method generates substantial phantom
“lost” revenues. For about one quarter of the firms, these phantom “lost” revenues
exceed 40% of actual revenues. Thus, for our sample, the method of using simple
averages following the damage period yields non-existent damages with even greater
frequency and at a higher level than the method of using “before” period averages.
C. Results from Applying Past Growth in Revenues to Project Sales
The analysis above applied the simple approach used in litigation in which
revenues of the plaintiff “but-for” the harmful act of the defendant were calculated
under the assumption that they would have been equal to the average revenues
obtained by the plaintiff during some benchmark period. Damages are also
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commonly calculated in litigation by assuming that the revenues of the plaintiff
would have grown during the period in which it was harmed.58
One way of projecting the plaintiff firm’s revenue growth is through
regression analysis. Regression analysis is a statistical method for estimating the
relationship between a “dependent” variable that one seeks to explain (in this case
revenues) and one or more “independent” variables (in this case time) presumed to
help explain changes in the dependent variable.59 Estimating a “linear trend”
through regression analysis is one simple way of projecting the growth of a firm by
estimating how revenues change over time.60 Calculation of growth rates using a
linear trend has been both illustrated in the texts on damages61 and utilized in
litigation.62
Under Daubert, one of the standards for evaluating a theory used by an expert
is that theory's “general acceptance.”63 In academic research using regression
analysis, the typical level at which a result is considered “statistically significant” is at
a five percent level.64 Using regression analysis properly, statistical significance at a
five percent threshold means that there is less than a five percent probability that the
result obtained was simply due to random chance.65 Because a five percent threshold
See, e.g., Swierczynski v. Arnold Foods Co., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (E.D. Mich. 2003); E.J.
McKernan Co. v. Gregory, 623 N.E.2d 981, 1000 (1993); DUNN, supra note 3, at § 6.26; GAUGHAN,
supra note 3, at 144-45; GLICK ET AL., supra note 1, at 34-35.
58

59

See GAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 150.

See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMIC
FORECASTS 425-28 (1976).
60

61

See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra note 3, at 147-51.

62

See, e.g., E.J. McKernan Co., 623 N.E.2d at 1000.

63

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).

See G.S. MADDALA, ECONOMETRICS 45 (1977). Some econometricians have argued that the five
percent threshold is arbitrary, overemphasized, and may be inappropriate in some circumstances. See,
e.g., EDWARD LEAMER, SPECIFICATION SEARCHES: AD HOC INFERENCE WITH NON-EXPERIMENTAL
DATA 103 (1978); D.V. Lindley, A Statistical Paradox, 44 BIOMETRIKA 187, 188 (1957). In addition,
commentators have debated whether a five percent threshold is appropriate for the litigation context.
See Lempert, supra note 49, at 1098-1103.
64

65

See MADDALA, supra note 64, at 45.
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is commonly applied (and might be labeled “generally accepted”), we also performed
calculations that limited calculating “lost” revenues to those instances in which there
was a statistically significant coefficient (at five percent) on the time trend variable.
Thus, an expert who utilized one of the models we employ would be able to appeal
not only to the use of the well established “before and after” approach but also to
the statistical significance of his or her results.
Table 4 below shows the percentages of firms for which calculated “lost”
revenues exceed the indicated thresholds using a linear trend analysis for our sample
firms.66 As shown, the linear trend model is very capable of generating damages
when they do not in fact exist. The frequency and magnitude of these phantom
“lost” revenues calculated using the linear trend model is greater than that obtained
using the average revenues before the year 2000 but less than that obtained using
average revenues after 2000. Limiting the use of the model to statistically significant
results improves matters but is hardly a cure-all. With this limitation, the method still
results in calculated “lost” revenues exceeding 10% of actual revenues for about one
quarter of the undamaged firms in our sample. These results should caution courts
to avoid placing excessive weight on the importance of statistical significance.

The simple linear trend model we use is specified as Rt = α + βt where Rt represents the revenues
of the firm at year t and t is a counter that starts at 1 in 1995 and increases by one for each subsequent
year. Appropriate use of regression techniques should consider a priori the appropriate model choice
and why it is being used. In addition, proper use of regression techniques entails diagnotics checking
for potential problems such as serial correlation and potentially correcting for any problems.
However, because our goal is only to assess the accuracy and manipulability of models employed
(whether or not they were properly employed) we have not examined these issues for the linear trends
we estimated.
66
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Table 4:

Percentage of Firms for Which Calculated “Lost” Revenues
Exceed Given Thresholds for a Fictional Damage Date Of 2000
Based on a Linear Trend Growth Model
Percentage of Firms Exceeding Selected Thresholds

All firms
Firms with a
statistically
significant "t"
statistic

>0%

>10%

>20%

>30%

>40%

>50%

No. of Firms

51%

42%

35%

28%

23%

19%

3739

31%

25%

20%

16%

13%

10%

3739

Notes: Linear trend model in which revenues for the year 2000 are projected based on a regression of annual sales
on a constant and a yearly time trend using data from 1995-1999. “Lost” revenues calculated as (projected
revenues for 2000 - actual revenues in 2000)/actual revenues in 2000. Statistically significant sample restricts “lost”
damages to those firms for which there was a statistically significant coefficient on the time trend variable used to
project revenues.

D. Manipulability
In addition to the issue of the accuracy of the simple implementations of the
before and after approach considered here, another issue of keen interest is the
manipulability of these models. As explained above, two sources of potential
manipulation are the choice of the data set and the choice of the method. We
considered three different methods: 1) the “before” method considered four
different “before” period data sets; 2) the method using subsequent period data
considered three different data sets; and 3) the linear trend growth model used one
data set. This leaves eight different avenues for an ethically challenged witness to
“find” lost revenues even when they don't exist.
We examined the potential for finding at least one damage model and data
set combination that yielded “lost” revenues at each selected threshold. Calculated
lost revenues for the linear trend model are limited to those in which there was a
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statistically significant coefficient on the time trend variable. To be sure, there are
numerous other methods (e.g., implementations of a yardstick approach) and data
sets that could have been used. Thus, the number of avenues for manipulation is
much larger than the eight scenarios we consider. This makes a finding of easy
manipulability even stronger.
Table 5 below shows the percentage of firms for which at least one of the
eight data set/method combinations yields “lost” revenues exceeding a given
threshold. As shown, at least one of the damages methodologies we employ yields
phantom “lost” revenues for over 70% of the sample firms. For nearly half of the
firms, there is at least one method that yields phantom “lost” revenues exceeding
20% of actual revenues.

Table 5:

Percentage of Firms for Which at Least One Damages Method Yields
Calculated “Lost” Revenues Exceeding Given Thresholds for a
Fictional Year 2000 Damage Date

Percentage of Firms
Exceeding Selected
Thresholds

>0%

>10%

70%

61%

>20%

48%

>30%

>40%

>50%

39%

32%

26%

Notes: Annual revenue data obtained for 5541 publicly traded firms from Compustat. “Lost” revenues are calculated as
(Projected revenue for year 2000 - year 2000 revenue)/year 2000 revenue. Three methods used for forecasting: 1) average
revenues before 2000 (date ranges of 1995-1999, 1996-1999,1997-1999, 1998-1999, 2) average revenues after 2000 (date
ranges of 2001-2004, 2001-2003, 2001-2002), 3) Linear trend model (only when statistically significant trend) - date range of
1995-1999.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRIER OF FACT
A. The Accuracy and Manipulability of Damages Calculations
As shown above, the simple models that we employ are very capable of
generating substantial “lost” revenues when they do not exist. The sample of firms
was close to a random sample. When one considers the non-random nature of suits
selected for litigation, however, the potential for inaccurate damages calculations
(including those in which the expert offering the damage calculations can appeal to
the statistical significance of his or her results) increases further.67
Firms whose financial performance generates claims for lost profits that are
particularly large are more likely to bring lawsuits.68 Thus, unlike our sample, which
includes firms who both performed relatively well during our damage year (relative
to other years) and those who performed relatively poorly, the trier of fact may be
viewing a sample of firms that is more likely to have been selected from the group of
firms performing relatively poorly. For this more limited sample, the probability of
the linear trend model generating “lost” revenues exceeding 10%, for example, may
be much greater than the calculated probability of 25% in our sample. For example,
our sample includes well over 300 publicly traded undamaged firms in the United
States for which a linear trend model with a statistically significant “t” statistic
generates lost revenues for the year 2000 that exceed 50% of actual revenues. Firms
in this group may be much more likely to bring a lawsuit, and lawyers looking for
potentially lucrative lawsuits may also be more inclined to focus on this group.
As shown above, damages methods can be highly manipulable. Thus, courts
should be very alert to the possibility that data sets or damages methods have been
selected to generate a “favorable” result. For the vast majority of publicly traded
firms, it is possible to “find” damages (and often substantial damages) where they
simply do not exist. Use of a more sophisticated method solves the problem only if
it has been used properly. Improper use of more sophisticated methods only
provides an additional potential avenue for manipulation. A requirement of
statistical significance does not resolve the concerns for inaccuracy and
manipulability. For a substantial number of firms in our sample, an expert would

67

See generally Rubinfeld, Multiple Regression, supra note 4, at 181-83.

See generally, George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 1, 4 (1984).
68
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have been able to provide a statistically significant result in presenting a calculation
for non-existent lost revenues.
In actual litigation, of course, it is likely that a defendant faced with a claim
for damages resulting from one of the methods we use would highlight the failure of
the method to account for other factors impacting the plaintiff's financial
performance.69 The defendant or an expert retained on behalf of the defendant
would also likely question the appropriateness of the method chosen and the date
range used. For our sample of undamaged firms, these critiques have merit. This
does not mean, however, that they would necessarily be successful. The plaintiff
could attempt to support the data set choice by arguing that, during the benchmark
period, market conditions were very similar to those during the damage period. It
might use company documents or company testimony to support this contention.
In addition, the plaintiff or the expert retained on behalf of the plaintiff may argue
that demand factors or supply factors were not substantially different during the
damage period and therefore did not have to be taken into account.
The models we employ do not explicitly account for demand factors or
supply factors unrelated to any harmful act (in our case a fictional harmful act) that
have caused firm revenues to change during the year 2000. It is the failure to
account for these demand and supply factors that leads to a calculation of phantom
“lost” revenues. Nevertheless, we believe that our results are applicable beyond the
simple methods that we examine. There is a large range of alternative damages
models available that purport to adjust for factors outside of the behavior of the
defendant while leaving a large claim for damages intact.
B. The Gatekeeping Role of the Courts
What are the prospects of courts performing a “gatekeeping” role and
excluding highly inaccurate and manipulated damages calculations? Before the
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, the typical standards for evaluating the
admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts were based on “relevance” and
“general acceptance.”70 Daubert placed federal judges in the role of “gatekeepers”
charged with screening out unreliable expert evidence. Many state courts now also
follow standards that are similar to federal standards, although the standards differ
Of course, damages methods can be misused by both plaintiffs and defendants. For ease of
exposition, we have focused on the possibility of inaccurate calculations by a plaintiff throughout.
69

See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2009-14 (1994).
70
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between states.71 Several studies have found that courts are more likely to exclude
expert testimony following Daubert.72
An important inquiry is whether courts have the inclination and the ability to
identify and exclude inaccurate or manipulated expert testimony on damages.
Daubert listed a non-exclusive list of four factors for federal judges to consider in
evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: 1) whether the theory can be (and
has been) tested; 2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication;” 3) the theory's potential rate of error; and 4) the theory's
general acceptance.73 On their face, these factors would seem to provide little
assurance that courts will consistently exclude inaccurate or manipulated damages
claims.
Consider the linear trend model used above, which was limited to a
statistically significant coefficient on the time trend variable, and each of the four
articulated Daubert factors. A plaintiff could certainly argue that: 1) testing was done
(there was a test for statistical significance); 2) the theory was subject to peer review
and publication (it used the "before and after" method and regression analysis, and
both have been used many times in published articles); 3) the potential rate of error
was known (a five percent significance threshold was used); and 4) the theory was
generally accepted (the "before and after" approach and regression analysis has been
accepted in published articles on many occasions). Yet, this approach yielded nonexistent damages for over 30% of our sample of firms.

71

See Keierleber & Bohan, supra note 18, at 3.

See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 1 (2000); LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN
FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 26 (2002).
72

73 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). The Committee Note accompanying
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence added five additional factors for consideration: 1) whether
the expert's testimony is the result of research he or she has done independently of the litigation, or
whether it was created just for the litigation; 2) “[w]hether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated
from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion;” 3) “whether the expert has adequately
accounted for obvious alternative explanations;” 4) whether the expert has used as much care as he or
she would have in his or her work outside of litigation; and 5) “[w]hether the field of expertise
claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the” topic on which the expert is opining.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
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The Daubert factors are non-exclusive, and Rule 702 sets forth a more general
standard that expert opinion be “reliable.”74 Moreover, the commentary to Rule 702
added additional criteria for consideration.75 In an empirical study of Daubert
decisions in federal court, Dixon and Gill concluded that “[o]ver time…, as judges
gained experience in evaluating reliability and as appellate court opinions clarified
their authority, they appear to have felt less compelled to address each Daubert factor
and to have paid increasing attention to more-general issues important to addressing
reliability.”76
Using the more general approach of assessing “reliability,” what is the
likelihood that courts will consistently exclude highly inaccurate or manipulated
damages calculations? With regard to simple methods, the likelihood that the courts
will exclude methods that do not properly account for other factors impacting sales
and profits is unclear. In CDM Mfg. Co. v. Complete Sales Representation, Inc.,77for
example, the plaintiff's expert relied on “mathematical extrapolation, straight line
linear progression and averaging to arrive at his numbers” for calculating lost
profits.78 The methods appear to be similar to the methods we examined. The
district court allowed the expert's testimony, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's opinion.79 In Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,80 the plaintiff’s
expert calculated the plaintiff's average annual growth in revenues from 1991
through 1994, applied this growth rate to the plaintiff's past sales to project “but-for”
sales, and subtracted actual sales to arrive at lost sales.81 The plaintiff's expert
apparently assumed that all of the difference between his projection and actual sales
was due to the defendant's behavior and did not account for other factors such as

74

See FED. R. EVID. 702.

75

See supra note 73.

76

DIXON & GILL, supra note 72, at 62.

77

50 Fed. App’x 348 (9th Cir. 2002).

78

Id. at 350.

79

Id.

80

360 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2004).

81

Id. at 875.
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“general economic conditions or increased competition.”82 The district court
allowed the expert's testimony.83 After listing the four Daubert factors, the Eight
Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision and instead concluded that an
analysis of other factors potentially affecting sales was required.84
Even if a court is diligent in requiring that an expert consider other factors
that may have impacted the plaintiff's performance, our results indicate that there is
ample opportunity for an expert to present an inaccurate damages estimate that
purportedly accounts for multiple factors. First, as noted above, improperly applied
multiple regression analysis can purport to account for other factors when it has not
sufficiently done so. Second, the availability of large phantom “lost” revenues leaves
ample room for an expert to account for other factors and subtract their impact
while still yielding a substantial remaining damage claim. For example, our sample
contains over 300 firms for which a simple linear trend analysis yields damages
exceeding 50% of revenues in 2000. An expert could account for multiple other
factors that caused, say, 30% of the “lost” revenues and present a damage calculation
for the remainder that would leave the plaintiff with a large claim for nonexistent
damages.
The evidence on actual judicial decision making should also lead one to
question whether the courts are equipped to recognize and exclude inaccurate and
manipulated damages calculations. One study found that 48% of state court judges
felt that they had not been adequately prepared to handle the range of scientific
evidence presented in their courtrooms.85 Another found that when the reliability of
expert evidence was challenged, a court found expert evidence unreliable in only
10% of the sample cases in which the court reflected favorably on whether the
expert's analysis met a standard of “general acceptance.”86 A plaintiff’s expert using a
linear trend model for our sample could note the “general acceptance” of both the
“before and after” method and regression analysis.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 881-82.

See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert
Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001).

85

86

DIXON & GILL, supra note 72, at 44.
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In order to properly address the accuracy of a damages study and whether or
not it has been subject to manipulation, the court must make several important
inquires.87 Because the choice of data used is important, the expert should be able to
provide a good rationale for choosing a particular date range. In addition, due to the
potentially severe problem of “ex-post” model selection, the expert should provide
an explanation of why a particular method was chosen over other methods. Because
damage methods can generate nonexistent damages in many instances, the expert
should also provide an economic explanation of the mechanism through which a
harmful act impacted the sales and profits of a plaintiff. In the absence of this
information, there can be little certainty that proffered damages are accurate and free
of manipulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our results indicate that simple methods for calculating lost profits that do
not take into account demand and supply factors are capable of being highly
inaccurate. In addition, this article has shown that damages methodologies in general
are highly manipulable. To the extent that accurate damages awards for plaintiff
firms promote such goals as just compensation, optimal deterrence, or efficient
breach, these goals will not be well served if damages received are highly inaccurate
and subject to manipulation. Moreover, this article has indicated a dismal likelihood
that courts will consistently screen out such damages calculations. In assessing
damages methods, it is highly important that the trier of fact be convinced that the
plaintiff has provided adequate explanations regarding the economics of how a
harmful act caused damages, why the particular data set was chosen, and why the
particular method was used.

Some commentators have opined that a court appointed neutral expert should be used to assess the
reliability of proffered damages calculations. See, e.g., Rubinfeld, Econometrics, supra note 4, at 1095-96.
This article does not address the implications of such a choice. Rather, it provides empirical evidence
on the extent to which damages models are manipulable and subject to inaccuracy.
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